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In  May  1984  a distinguished  group  of  central  bankers  and  economists  gathered 
for  a  conference  at  Bretton  Woods  to  consider  the  evolution  of  the  world 
monetary  system  that  was  born  at  that  location  forty  years  earlier.  This 
volume  contains  nine  essays, with  accompanying  discussion,  on  issues  of 
performance  and  reform  of  current  international  monetary  arrangements. 
These  papers  deal  with  problems  facing  the  industrialized  and  the  less- 
developed  countries,  and  assess the  institutions  that  have  been  set  up  to 
accommodate  these problems. 
The  major  accomplishments  of  the  original  Bretton  Woods  Conference 
were,  of  course,  the  establishment  of  the  system  of  payments  based  on  fixed 
exchange  rates  and  the  organization  of  the  World  Bank  and  the  International 
Monetary  Fund.  As  the  order  developed  in  the  late  40’s  and  early  50’s,  each 
central  bank  saw  it  as its  duty  to  intervene  in  foreign  exchange  markets  to 
ensure  an  essentially  fixed  parity  of  their  currency  with  respect  to  the  dollar. 
The  role  of  the  U.S.  was to  guarantee  the  dollar  price  of  gold  at  $35  an  ounce. 
The  system  has been  called  a ‘dollar  standard’  because  the  dollar  played  the 
role  of  a  reserve  currency.  One  of  the  paradoxes  of  the  system,  as Robert 
Triffin  pointed  out  in  the  early  60’s,  is that  in  order  to  produce.  a  continuing 
and  rapid  enough  expansion  of  world  reserves, the  U.S.  had  to  run  balance  of 
payments  deficits,  yet continued  deficits  by  the  U.S.  threatened  the  convertibil- 
ity  of  the  dollar  into  gold. 
As  it happened,  the  system of  fixed  parities  broke  down  in  the  early  70’s not 
because  of  a lack  of  reserves, but  because  a glut  of  dollars  made  the  Bretton 
Woods  dollar  exchange  rates  untenable.  The  system  eventually  evolved  into 
one  in  which  most  of  the  industrialized  countries’  currencies  more  or  less are 
determined  by  the market,  while  the  currencies  of  most  second  and  third  world 
countries  are  pegged  to  a  major  currency.  The  floating  period  has  been 
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characterized  by  great  fluctuations  in  exchange  rates  over  short  periods  of 
time.  In  addition,  international  financial  markets  have  in  recent  years  been 
beset  with  the  dilemma  of  rising  foreign  debt  in  many  Latin  American 
countries  with  a threat  of  possible  default  on  billions  of  dollars  of  loans. 
In  a  sense,  each  of  the  three  crises -  the  breakdown  of  fixed  parities,  the 
wide  changes  in  exchange  rates  in  the  tlexible  period,  and  the  Latin  American 
debt  predicament  -  could  not  have  occurred  without  the  much  greater  open- 
ness of  international  financial  markets  that  has  evolved  since  1944.  The  most 
significant  developments  over  the  last  forty  years  in  the  international  financial 
system  have  been  the  efforts  to  reduce  capital  controls  and  the  development  of 
international  capital  markets  (such  as Eurocurrency  markets).  The  immediate 
source  of  the  demise  of  the  fixed  rate  system  was  the  massive  speculation 
against  the  dollar  in  1971  and  again  in  1973.  There  seems  to  be  wide 
agreement  that  the  culprit  behind  the  great  variations  in  exchange  rates  in  the 
70’s  and  80’s  has  been  international  capital  flows.  The  level of  borrowing  by 
LDC’s  was  never  a concern  until  the  1970’s  when  the  recycled  ‘petrodollars’ 
began  to  find  their  way  in  increasing  numbers  into  the  hands  of  the  industriril- 
izing  nations.  If  the  original  plan  of  the  Bretton  Woods  Conference  of  1944 
failed,  its  demise  can  be  blamed  at  least  in  part  on  the  vastly  changed 
circumstances  that  the  international  payments  system  had  to  accommodate  in 
the  1970’s. 
Many  of  the  papers  of  this  volume  are  concerned  with  the  problem  of 
fluctuating  exchange  rates  and  policies  aimed  at  dampening  the  flux.  Robert 
Aliber,  in  his  comments  on  the  essay of  Henry  Wallich,  suggests that  there  are 
basically  four  policies  that  can  combat  the  excessive  volatility  of  exchange 
rates  caused  by  capital  movements:  (1)  a  return  to  some  form  of  pegged 
exchange  rates,  (2)  official  intervention  in  foreign  exchange  markets  to  keep 
exchange  rates  within  some band,  (3) coordination  of  macroeconomic  policies, 
and  (4)  capital  controls.  To  these four  options  may  be  added  a fifth  suggested 
by  Richard  Cooper  -  the  establishment  of  a single  world  currency.  It  is useful 
to  take  up  each  of  these prescriptions  in  turn.  First,  though,  we  must  ask why 
a volatile  exchange  rate  is undesirable. 
It  would  be generally  incorrect  to  state  that  the  problem  lies in  the  increased 
uncertainty  faced  by  individuals  in  international  goods  markets.  The  same 
financial  innovations  that  are blamed  for  bringing  about  increased  variability 
in  currency  prices  by  lowering  the  costs of  exchange  market  speculation  have 
provided  means  .by  which  much  exchange  risk  can  be  hedged.  An  American 
firm  that  agrees  to  buy  German  goods  six  months  from  now  at  a  set  mark 
price  can  eliminate  all exchange  risk  through  forward  purchases  of  marks.  As 
Anthony  Solomon  points  out,  in  his  remarks  on  Cooper’s  contribution,  the 
volume  of  international  trade  dropped  dramatically  in  the  1930’s  -  ‘from 
almost  $3  billion  per  month  in  January  1929  to  less  than  $1  billion  in 
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well  developed.  This  contrasts  to  the  experience  of  the  70’s and  80’s, in  which 
the  volume  of  trade  has  grown  steadily. 
The  problem  instead  arises when  changes  in  exchange  rates  lead  to  patterns 
of  relative  goods  prices  that  do  not  reflect  underlying  resource  costs.  The 
central  dilemma  is that  goods  markets  do  not  clear as fast  as financial  markets, 
so that  goods  prices  do  not  respond  as rapidly  as exchange  rates.  It  is unlikely 
that  one  can  explain  much  of  the  drop  in  the  relative  price  of  a  bottle  of 
French  wine  to  a  bottle  of  Californian  wine  since  1980  by  appealing  to 
arguments  about  cost-saving  production  improvements  in  France  or  changes 
in  taste  in  favor  of  California  wines.  From  a viewpoint  of  economic  efficiency 
it  would  seem  that  the  shift  in  wine  output  toward  France  is costly  for  the 
world  as a whole. 
This  problem  is not  unique  to  flexible  exchange  rate  systems. The  problem 
lies with  sticky  goods  prices  and  these can be just  as sticky  in  a system  of  6xed 
exchange  rates.  However,  some  support  for  the  proposition  that  relative  price 
variations  that  do  not  reflect  underlying  taste  or  cost  changes  are not  so large 
under  fixed  exchange  rates might  be gleaned  from  Genberg’s  (1978)  conclusion 
that  purchasing  power  parity  holds  more  nearly  in  fixed  exchange  rate  regimes 
(although  there  are  other  potential  explanations  of  his  results). 
Several of  the  authors  in  this  volume  believe  that  a move  back  to  6xed  rates 
is infeasible.  Edward  Bernstein  traces  the  rise  in  foreign  capital  transactions 
and  concludes:  ‘No  system  of  fixed  parities  can  function  with  such  a pattern 
of  international  payments.’  Although  he  notes  the  problems  caused  by  the 
recent  appreciation  of  the  dollar,  he concludes:  ‘It  has not  been  accompanied 
by  an  exchange  crisis, or  worse,  that  would  have  been  unavoidable  with  fixed 
par  values.’  Anthony  Solomon  states:  ‘But  the  problem  of  capital  flows  is now 
even  more  severe.  The  sheer  size  of  international  financial  markets,  their 
greater  integration  with  national  linancial  markets  and  the  more  aggressive 
and  innovative  management  of  money  make  the  chances  of  a fixed  exchange 
rate  system  working  pretty  low.’  According  to  Cooper:  ‘An  attempt  to 
maintain  fixed  but  adjustable  exchange  rates  would  almost  certainly  have 
required  a  much  higher  degree  of  controls  over  not  only  capital  but  also 
current  transactions  than  in  fact  prevailed.  Thus  exchange  rate  flexibility 
helped  to  preserve  a  relatively  open  trading  and  financial  system.’  Otmar 
Emminger  believes  that  fIxed  rates,  at  least  for  the  dollar,  would  be  impossi- 
ble:  ‘The  chief  reason  is  the  enormous  amount  of  highly  liquid  and  volatile 
dollar  holdings  in  the  world,  which  would  quickly  topple  any  fixed  dollar  rate 
and  derail  even  a  mere  target  zone  arrangement  as  soon  as  economic  and 
financial  uncertainties  arise  or  psychological  or  political  accidents  occur. 
Floating  is the  only  available  protection  against  large  volatile  money  flows.’ 
The  high  degree  of  capital  mobility  and  asset substitutability  would  seem to 
make  sterilization  of  money  flows  infeasible  if  fixed  rates  were  implemented 
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sterilization  in  the  60’s [see Obstfeld  (1982)],  as that  decade  drew  to  a  close 
such  a  policy  became  increasingly  difficult.  When  the  system  of  fixed  rates 
collapsed,  it  was  clear  that  the  magnitude  of  private  speculative  capital  flows 
would  be  so  large  that  exchange  rates  that  were  fundamentally  indefensible 
could  not  be  sustained.  For  example,  in  the  first  hour  of  trading  on  May  5, 
1971,  the  Bundesbank  purchased  more  than  $1 billion  [Solomon  (1982)]  before 
finally  giving  up  and  suspending  intervention  operations.  After  parities  were 
restored,  another  dollar  crisis developed  in  early  1973.  On  March  1, European 
central  banks  bought  over  $3.6  billion  before  officially  closing  their  foreign 
exchange  markets.  Since  1973,  capital  markets  have  continued  to  develop. 
Efforts  by  central  bank  to  intervene  against  the  dollar  in  early  1985  seemed  to 
have  little  effect  on  exchange  rates. 
The  problem  with  fixed  rates  goes beyond  the  likelihood  that  independent 
macroeconomic  policies  could  not  be pursued  in  each country.  The  fear  is that 
capital  market  flows  would  force  on  a country  undesirable  policy  choices.  If 
investors  decide  that  the  central  bank’s  commitment  to  a  given  parity  is not 
credible,  then,  in  order  to  defend  such a parity  the  central  bank  may  be  forced 
to  pursue  highly  contractionary  policies.  Far  from  leading  to  a  worldwide 
system  of  coordinated,  stable  macroeconomic  policies,  a system  of  fixed  rates 
might  require  divergent  and  variable  macroeconomic  policies  aimed  at heading 
off  speculative  attacks. 
A  system  of  freely  flexible  exchange  rates is sometimes  criticized  because the 
level  of  the  exchange  rate  can  be  determined  by  expectations  that  are  not 
based  in  any  way  on  market  fundamentals.  The  exchange  market  is said  to  be 
subject  to  speculative  ‘bubbles’.  In  his  essay Cooper  describes  a bubble  as a 
phenomenon  ‘  . . .  in  which  prices  can  be  rationally  pushed  beyond  their 
long-run  equilibrium  values  so  long  as  the  participants  expect  the  risk  of 
relapse  to  fall  short  of  the  prospect  of  further  gain  . . .  [IIn  some  periods 
expectations  about  the  ‘fundamentals’  may  be  so weakIy  held  that  the rate  can 
be  dominated  by  purely  market  dynamics  for  longish  periods,  measured  in 
weeks  or  months  . . .  [A]n  unnecessary  and  avoidable  element  of  instability  is 
introduced  into  national  economies.’  In  a  recent  work,  however,  Flood  and 
Garber  (1984)  have  shown  that,  in  a  sense, a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  is 
equally  subject  to  speculative  bubbles.  The  market  can  form  an opinion  that  a 
central  bank  can  no longer  sustain  a fixed  exchange  rate,  and  this  opinion  may 
not  be  based  on  any  market  data.  Yet,  if  everyone  is convinced  the  fixed  rate 
will  collapse,  there  will  be  a  speculative  attack  on  the  central  bank’s  foreign 
currency  reserves  and  expectations  will  be  fulfilled. 
Trilhn’s  paper  addresses a particular  reform  that  he points  out  has achieved 
some  greater  exchange  rate  stability  -  the  European  Monetary  System.  He 
states  that  much  progress  has  been  made  at  curbing  real  exchange  rate 
variability  among  member  countries,  though  they  have  been  somewhat  less 
successful  in  coordinating  policy  decisions.  Triffin’s  evidence,  however,  must 
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in  the  EMS  has  been  achieved  by  explicitly  limiting  capital  movements 
through  controls.  He  finds  direct  evidence  (on  the  difference  between  onshore 
and  offshore  interest  rates  for  the  lira  and  franc),  and  indirect  evidence  that 
capital  controls  were  binding  and  may  explain  the  reduction  in  exchange  rate 
fluctuations. 
‘Target  zones’  or  wide  bands  in  which  exchange  rates  would  be  allowed  to 
fluctuate  were  a much  discussed  cure  for  the  current  problems  of  the  intema- 
tional  monetary  system.  Both  Cooper  and  Robert  Roosa  argue  that  the  logical 
next  step  would  be  to introduce  more  stability  into  the  system  with  such zones. 
It  could  be  said  that  any  fixed  exchange  rate  system  is a band  proposal.  The 
difference  here  is  one  of  magnitude  -  the  bands  within  which  exchange  rates 
would  be  allowed  to  fluctuate,  as envisioned  by  Cooper  and  Roosa,  would  be 
much  wider  than  those  usually  associated  with  ‘fixed’  parities.  It  seems  that 
the  target  zone  system  is subject  to  the  problems  of  both  the  fixed  and  flexible 
systems.  As exchange  rates  approach  the  limits  of  the  zone,  the possibility  of  a 
speculative  attack  on  the  central  bank’s  reserves  arises.  On  the  other  hand, 
within  the  band,  the  exchange  rate  will  continue  to  vary  more  rapidly  than 
nominal  goods  prices.  Indeed,  Dombusch  (1983)  argues  that  policies  to  keep 
an  exchange  rate  within  a band  will  lead  to  more  volatility  of  the  rates  inside 
the  band.  If  the  commitment  to  maintain  the  band  is credible,  then  the  risk  of 
large  exchange  rate  movements  is reduced.  A  change  in  the  relative  rates  of 
returns  on  assets in  the  two  countries  involved  will  lead  to  bigger  shifts  in 
portfolio  composition  and,  thus,  more  exchange  rate  movement.  Dombusch 
argues  that  it  makes  no  sense to  set limits  on  exchange  rates  but  not  on  other 
macroeconomic  variables. 
As  Jacob  Frenkel  points  out  in  his  remarks  on  Roosa’s  essay,  the  real 
problem  is not  the  flexible  exchange  rate  system,  but  the  lack  of  coordination 
of  macroeconomic  policy.  ‘If  governments  were  willing  to  follow  policies 
consistent  with  the  maintenance  of  a  gold  standard,  then  the  gold  standard 
itself  would  not  be  necessary;  if  however,  governments  are  not  willing  to 
follow  such  policies,  then  the  introduction  of  the  gold  standard  per  se will  not 
restore  stability  since,  before  long,  the  standard  will  have  to  be  abandoned.’ 
Frenkel  does  not  think  it  very  likely  that  governments  will  abandon  control 
over  domestic  policies.  He  likens  the  problem  to  an  oligopoly  problem.  If 
everybody  cooperates,  the  group  is better  off,  but  each individual  country  has 
an  incentive  to  cheat  on  the  agreement.  It  is not  clear  whether  this  analogy  is 
entirely  appropriate  in  this  context,  because  the  policy  game  is more  like  an 
infinitely  repeated  game  rather  than  a  one-shot  game.  In  infinite  games,  an 
equilibrium  might  exist  in  which  fear  of  reprisal  enforces  something  like 
cooperation.  However,  these  games  have  many  equilibria,  and  perhaps  it  is 
clear  that  the  policy-makers  now  have  not  settled  on  cooperation. 
The  alternative  to  explicit  policy  coordination  would  be  imposition  of 
capital  controls.  This  option  was  generally  treated  in  the  presentations  in  this 
volume  as something  to  be  avoided,  presumably  because  the  long-run  costs of 446  C.  Engel,  The  international  monetary  system 
microeconomic  inefficiency  are  perceived  to  outweigh  whatever  short-run 
macroeconomic  gains  might  occur  from  the  controls.  Not  all economists  find 
the  trade-off  undesirable.  Tobin  (1978)  has  argued  that  we  need  to  ‘throw 
some  sand  in  the  wheels  of  our  excessively  efficient  international  money 
markets’.  He  proposes  a  tax  on  all  spot  conversions  of  one  currency  into 
another.  Cooper  and  Aliber  each  suggest  that  capital  controls  are  unlikely  to 
be  successful  simply  because people  will  hnd  a way  around  them. 
A  separate  argument  against  capital  controls  has been  advanced  by  Frankel 
(1983)  and  others.  The  argument  simply  put  is that  the  real problem  facing  the 
U.S.  economy  and  the  world  economy  is the  fiscal and  monetary  mix  in  the 
U.S.  that  has  driven  up  real  interest  rates.  Although  the  appreciation  of 
the  dollar  has  severely worsened  the  current  deficit,  the  current  account  can  be 
viewed  as  a  safety  valve  that  allows  the  steam  from  the  budget  deficit  to 
escape.  With  no  capital  inflow  from  abroad,  domestic  capital  markets  would 
have  to  absorb  the  sale  of  bonds  to  finance  the  deficit.  Real  interest  rates 
would  be  much  higher,  and  the  consequent  effect  on  lowering  investment  and 
long-run  growth  would  be more  severe. This  viewpoint  argues  that  free  capital 
mobility,  then,  improves  from  a  macroeconomic  perspective  the  outlook 
following  the  large  government  budget  deficits. 
Cooper  proposes  that  over  the  next  twenty-five  years  the  major  industrial 
countries  move  toward  adopting  a  common  currency.  There  are  clearly  ad- 
vantages  to  such  a plan.  Although  this  system has  many  of  the  characteristics 
of  a fixed  exchange  rate  regime,  it  would  seem  to  avoid  some  of  the  problems 
associated  with  fixed  parities.  In  the  first  place,  the  problem  of  whether  the 
pledge  to  maintain  the fixed  rates  is credible  all but  disappears  under  Cooper’s 
plan.  Secondly,  there’ are  no  issues involving  the  adequacy  of  foreign  reserve 
holdings.  The  single  world  currency  would  act  like  the  ideal  textbook  hxed 
exchange  rate  system.  The  drawback  is that  no  country  would  exercise control 
over  its  own  monetary  policy.  Thus,  the  real  question  about  Cooper’s  plan  is 
whether  countries  would  be  willing  to  make  such  a sacrifice  of  policy-making 
powers. 
Perhaps  it  would  be safe to  conclude  that  the  participants  in  this  conference 
agree  that  the  weakness  of  the  monetary  arrangements  that  exist  between  the 
industrialized  countries  is  magnified  by  their  current  choice  of  policy  mix. 
Henry  Wallich  deduces  in his essay that  the source  of  the  U.S.  current  account 
deficit  and  the  appreciation  of  the  dollar  in  the  80’s  is  capital  flows.  In 
particular,  budget  deficits  have  pushed  up  the  real  return  to  dollar  securities 
causing  foreign  investors  to  be  attracted  to  the  dollar.  At  the  same  time  other 
countries  -  Germany  in  particular  -  have  followed  more  conservative  fiscal 
policies  but  allowed  easier  money,  thus  accenting  the  differential  in  asset 
returns.  It  is  argued  by  several  participants  that  in  the  absence  of  this 
divergence  of  macroeconomic  policy,  the  flexible  exchange  rate  system  would 
be  working  fine.  Conversely,  given  this  difference  in  the  fiscal-monetary  mix, 
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It  is  also  claimed,  by  Pedro-Pablo  Kuczynski,  that  the  high  real  interest 
rates  in  the  U.S.  contribute  to  the  Latin  American  debt  problem  by  increasing 
the  real  interest  burden  for  the  debtor  nations.  In  addition  the  U.S.  recession 
has  dampened  demand  for  imports  from  these  countries.  On  the  other  hand, 
since  most  of  the  debtor  countries’  currencies  do  not  float  relative  to  the 
dollar,  their  current  accounts  have  not  benefited  from  the  dollar  appreciation. 
He  proposes  some  intervention  in  loan  markets  to  ensure  that  new  loans  to  the 
debtors  be  granted  at  lower  than  market  interest  rates. 
John  Williamson  discusses the  need  to  increase  liquidity  for  the  developing 
countries.  He  believes  the  current  level of  international  liquidity  is not  enough 
to  sustain  worldwide  economic  recovery,  so he  proposes  a new  allocation  of 
SDR  10  billion.  He  also  recommends  the  establishment  of  an  SDR 
clearinghouse  to  enhance  the  SDR’s  use in  private  transactions. 
The  essays of  Adolf0  Diz  and  Jacques  Polak  address  how  the  IMF  assists 
the  developing  countries  with  debt  problems.  Diz  traces  the  growth  of  condi- 
tionality  at  the  IMF.  He points  out  that  before  the  Bretton  Woods  Conference 
the  concept  of  conditionality  was  present  in  many  of  the  proposals  for  the 
IMF.  It  was  also  implicit  in  the  early  years  of  the  program.  However,  as the 
scope  and  size of  lending  increased,  so did  conditionality.  In  the  1970’s  there 
sprung  up  new  temporary  lending  facilities  that  served  effectively  to  lower  the 
degree  of  conditionality.  Diz  observes  that  at  some  point  in  the  70’s the  trend 
toward  less conditionality  was reversed  as more  and  more  countries  used their 
upper  credit  tranches. 
Polak  describes  the  eternal  dilemma  of  the  IMF  in  trying  to  deal  with  a 
balance  of  payments  problem  for  some  country  as the  decision  of  how  much 
of  the  imbalance  should  be  tlnanced  and  how  much  the  IMF  should  insist  on 
measures  of  adjustment.  Polak  points  out  that  in  the  1970’s  many  countries 
turned  to  commercial  banks  as  a  source  of  financing  because  the  Fund’s 
resources  were  not  adequate.  Since  1980,  the  Fund  has  increased  its  role  as a 
lender  and  as a financial  organizer. 
Polak  does  not,  however,  seriously  address  the  question  of  why  the  IMF 
should  play  a large  role  in  organizing  sources of  finance  for  debtor  nations.  It 
has  been  argued  by  Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1983)  that  the  IMF  can  play  a 
valuable  part  by  gathering  potential  lenders  into  a cohesive  unit.  When  lenders 
are  atomistic,  no  individual  lender  can  offer  much  threat  of  retaliation  in  the 
event  of  default  by  the  borrower.  This  absence  of  threat  hurts  the  borrower, 
since  lenders  will  be  unwilling  to  commit  much  resources  without  adequate 
assurance  there  will  be  no  default.  When  lenders  can  act  collusively,  they  can 
effectively  threaten  large  penalties  in  the  event  of  default  -  such as cutting  the 
lender  off  from  all  future  loans.  In  the  face  of  such  threats,  the  borrower  is 
unlikely  to  default  -  and  so is  a better  credit  risk  in  the  eyes of  the  lenders. 
Additionally,  Eaton  and  Gersovitz  argue,  the  IMF  can play  an important  role 
in  gathering  and  providing  information  to  commercial  banks  on  the  credit- 
worthiness  of  potential  borrowers.  It  has  also  been  argued  [Council  of 448  C. Engel,  The international  monetary system 
Economic  Advisers  (1984)]  that  if  the  debt  problems  of  the  LDCs  are  transi- 
tory  rather  than  structural,  an organization  such as the  IMF  has an  important 
function.  When  a  fundamentally  solvent  borrower  suffers  temporary  liquidity 
problems,  any  individual  banks  might  find  it  in  its interest  to  minimize  risk  by 
refusing  refinancing  to  this  debtor.  However,  such  action  increases  the  prob- 
ability  of  default  on  loans  this  borrower  has obtained  from  other  banks.  There 
is private  market  failure  because  each lender  does not  adequately  consider  the 
full  social value  of  lending  another  dollar  -  that  is, they  do  not  internalize  how 
their  loans  lower  the  probability  of  default  for  other  lenders.  The  IMF’s  task is 
to  organize  the  commercial  banks  in  order  to  ensure  that  refinancing  continues 
in  the  event  of  a temporary  liquidity  crisis. Thus,  the  IMF  would  seem to  have 
a  role  in  shoring  up  weaknesses  in  the  private  loan  market.  The  essential 
unanswered  question  is  how  large  should  that  role  be?  Is  the  current  IMF 
involvement  too  large  or  is it  inadequate? 
Perhaps  a  fair  summary  of  this  volume  is that  almost  all  participants  agree 
that  the  international  monetary  system  needs reform  to  cope  with  the  crises of 
too  variable  exchange  rates  and  excessive LDC  debt.  Yet  there  seems to  be  no 
consensus  on  what  should  be  done.  Few  new  proposals  are  offered  in  this 
volume.  The  proposals  that  are most  likely  to  have  some positive  return  -  such 
as  greater  coordination  of  macroeconomic  policies  among  the  leading  in- 
dustrialized  nations  -  seem unlikely  to  be  implemented  in  the  near  future. 
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